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Adrian Schwaninger, Diana Hardmeier, Franziska Hofer 
Department of Psychologv, University of Zurich, Switzerland 
Abstract - A central aspect of airport security is reliable 
detection of forbidden objects in passenger bags using X- 
ray screening equipment. Human recognition involves 
visual processing of the X-ray image and matching items 
with object representations stored in visual memory. Thus, 
without knowing which objects are  forbidden and what 
they look like, prohibited items are  difficult to recognize 
(aspect of visual knowledge). In order to measure whether 
a screener has acquired the necessary visual knowledge, 
we have applied the prohibited items test (PIT). This test 
contains different forbidden items according to 
international prohibited items lists. The items are  placed in 
X-ray images of passenger bags so that the object shapes 
can be seen relatively well. Since all images can he 
inspected for 10 seconds, failing to recognize a threat item 
can be mainly attributed to a lack of visual knowledge. 
The object recognition test (ORT) is more related to 
visual processing and encoding. Three image-based factors 
can be distinguished that challenge different visual 
processing abilities. First, depending on the rotation within 
a bag, an  object can be more or  less difticnlt to recognize 
(effect of viewpoint). Second, prohibited items can be more 
or less superimposed by other objects, which can impair 
detection performance (effect of superposition). Third, the 
number and type of other objects in a hag can challenge 
visual search and processing capacity (effect of bag 
complexity). The ORT has been developed to measure how 
well screeners can cope with these image-based factors. 
This test contains only guns and knives, placed into bags 
in different views with different superposition and  
complexity levels. Detection performance is determined by 
the ability of a screener to detect threat items despite 
rotation, superposition and bag complexity. Since the 
shapes of guns and knives a re  usually known well even by 
novices, the aspect of visual threat object knowledge is of 
minor importance in this test. 
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A total of 134 aviation security screeners and 134 
novices participated in this study. Detection performance 
was measured using A'. The three image-based factors of 
the ORT were validated. The effect of view, superposition 
and bag complexity were highly significant. The validity of 
the PIT was examined by comparing the two participant 
groups. Large differences were found in detection 
performance between screeners and novices for the PIT. 
This result is consistent with the assumption that the PIT 
measures aspects related to visual knowledge. Although 
screeners were also better than novices in the ORT, the 
relative difference was much smaller. This result is 
consistent with the assumption that the ORT measures 
image-based factors that  are  related to visual processing 
abilities whereas the PIT is more related to visual 
knowledge. For  both tests, large inter-individual 
differences were found. Reliability was high for both 
participant groups and tests, indicating that they can be 
used for measuring performance on an individual basis. 
The application of the ORT and PIT for screener 
certification and competency assessment are  discussed. 
Index Term-human factors in aviation security, 
certification and competency assessment, X-ray detection 
performance, pre-employment assessment of screeners 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of aviation security has changed 
dramatically in the last years. As a consequence of the new 
threat situation large investments into technology have been 
made. State-of-the-art X-ray machines provide high resolution 
images, many image enhancement features and even automatic 
detection of explosive material. However, it is becoming clear 
since recently that the best technology is only as valuable as 
the humans that operate it. Indeed, reliable recognition of 
threat items in X-ray images of passenger bags is a demanding 
task. Consider the images depicted in Figure 1. Each of the 
two bags contains a threat item that could be used to severely 
harm people. Even though most people would probably 
recognize prohibited items like the gas spray in Figure la 
when depicted in a photograph, this and other threat objects 
are relatively hard to recognize for novices because the shape 
features look quite different in an X-ray image than in reality. 
Other dangerous items (e.g. the switchblade knife in Figure 
lb) might be missed by a novice because they look similar to 
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harmless objects (e.g. a pen). Several other threat objects are 
usually not encountered in real life (e.g. improvised explosive 
devices, IEDs), which stresses the importance of computer- 
based training in order to achieve a high detection 
performance within a few seconds of inspection time [ I ]  
The Object Recognition Test (ORT) has been developed to 
measure how well screeners can cope with such image-based 
factors [SI. In order to reduce effects of visual knowledge, 
only guns and knives are used in this test, i.e. object shapes 
that are usually well known also by novices. 
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Fig. I .  Examples of prohibited items in X-ray images of passenger bags. (a) 
gas spray in the center of the baggage below the eyeglasses, (b) switchblade 
knife slightly above the center of the baggage next to the keys. 
In  short, the knowledge about which items are prohibited 
and what they look like in an X-ray image is certainly an 
important determinant for detection performance. The 
Prohibited Items Test (PIT) has been developed to measure 
this knowledge-based component and it therefore contains a 
large number of different forbidden objects according to 
international prohibited items lists [ 2 ] .  
As pointed out by [3j several image-based effects influence 
how well threat items can be recognized in X-ray images 
(Figure 2). Viewpoint can strongly affect recognition 
performance, which has been shown previously in many object 
recognition studies (for reviews see [4] - 171). Since objects are 
often superimposed on each other in X-ray images, the degree 
of superposition can affect detection performance 
substantially. Another image-based factor is bag complexity, 
which is determined by the type and number of objects in  a 
bag. 
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Fig. 2. Image-based factors according to [3]: (a) viewpoint of the threat item 
(canonical YS. non-canonical), (b) bag complexity (low vs. high). (c) 
superposition of the threat item (law vs. high). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of image- 
based and knowledge based factors in X-ray screening using 
these two different tests. To what extent screeners know which 
items are prohibited and what they look like in passenger hags 
is measured by the PIT. It includes prohibited i tem of 
different categories in X-ray images of passenger bags while 
keeping effects of view, superposition and bag complexity 
relatively constant. The objects are displayed in an easy view 
with a moderate degree of superposition in bags of limited 
complexity during 10 seconds per image. If a participant fails 
to detect a threat item it is therefore rather related to a lack of 
visual knowledge than to an attentional failure or visual 
processing capacity limitations. Since many different 
prohibited items with shapes that are often not known from 
everyday experience are used in the PIT, a substantial 
difference in detection performance between novices and 
screeners could be expected. The ORT measures how good 
someone can cope with image-based factors such as view, 
superposition and bag complexity. As mentioned above, only 
guns and knives are used in this test, i.e. object shapes that are 
well known by both screeners and novices. Therefore, smaller 
differences between screeners and novices might be expected 
for the ORT compared to the PIT. However, expertise might 
increase visual abilities that are necessary in order to cope with 
image difficulty resulting from effects of viewpoint, 
superposition and bag complexity. Therefore, the effect size of 
the interaction between image-based effects and expertise is an 
important measure in this study as well. 
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II. METHOD 
A. Participanfs 
A total of 268 participants took part in this study. Half of 
them were aviation security screeners, the other half were 
novices. All participants were tested with the ORT and then 
the PIT. The screener group consisted of 67 females and 67 
males at the age between 24 and 57 years ( M =  41.05 years, 
SD = 7.84 years). All of them had undergone initial class-room 
and on the job training and they had at least two years of work 
experience in airport security screening of carry-on bags. 
The novices group consisted of 134 males between 21 and 
26 years (M = 23.24 years, SD = 1.22 years). 
B. Materials and Procedure 
I )  Prohibited Items Test (PIU 
This test contains a wide spectrum of prohibited items 
which can be classified into seven categories according to 
international prohibited items lists [2]. The PIT version used in 
this study included a total of 19 guns, 27 sharp objects, 14 
blunt and hunt instruments, 5 highly inflammable substances, 
17 explosives, 3 chemicals and 13 other prohibited items (e.g. 
buckshot, ivory). All prohibited items were depicted from an 
easy viewpoint and combined with a hag of medium 
complexity and low superposition, so that their shapes could 
be seen relatively well and the influence of image-bared 
factors could he minimized. X-ray images were taken from 
Heimann 6040i machines and displayed in color. 68 bags 
contained one threat item, 6 hags contained two threat items, 
and 6 bags contained three threat items. Each bag was shown 
twice resulting in a total of 160 trials. There were four blocks 
of 40 trials. Block order was counterbalanced across four 
groups of participants using a Latin Square design. Trial order 
was randomized within each block. Only responses to images 
containing one threat item were used for statistical analyses. 
The PIT is fully computer-based and starts with a self- 
explanatory instruction, followed by a brief training session 
with eight examples to familiarize the participants with the 
procedure. Feedback is provided after each trial only in the 
introductory phase. Each X-ray image was displayed for a 
maximum of 10 seconds in the introductory and test phase. 
This duration is long enough to ensure that missing a threat 
item can be mainly attributed to a lack of visual knowledge 
rather than a failure of attention. For each image, participants 
had to decide whether the bag was OK (no threat) or NOT OK 
(threat) and indicate on a slider how sure they were in their 
decision (confidence ratings on a 50 point scale). In addition, 
participants had to indicate the threat category of the 
prohibited item(s) by clicking the corresponding buttons on the 
screen (for NOT OK decisions only). Pressing the space bar 
displayed the next image. As the test was subdivided into four 
blocks, participants were allowed to take a short break after a 
block was completed. 
2) Object Recognition Test (ORV 
As explained in the introduction, [3] pointed out that image- 
based factors such as viewpoint, superposition and bag 
complexity can substantially affect detection performance in 
X-ray images. The ORT has been designed to measure how 
well people can cope with such image-based factors rather 
than measuring knowledge-based determinants of threat 
detection performance [8]. To this end, guns and knives with 
the blade open are used in the ORT, i.e. object shapes that can 
he assumed to he known by most people. In addition, all guns 
and knives are shown for IO seconds before the test starts, 
which further reduces the role of knowledge based factors in 
this test. 
In reality, a threat object can he depicted from a difficult 
viewpoint in a close-packed bag and be superimposed by other 
objects. The X-ray images used in the ORT vary 
systematically in image difficulty by varying the degree of 
view difficulty, bag complexity and superposition, both 
independently and in combination. This makes it possible to 
investigate main effects as well as interactions between the 
image-based factors. All X-ray images of the ORT are in 
black-and-while, as color per se is mainly diagnostic for the 
material of objects in the bag and thus could he primarily 
helpful for experts. 
Eight guns and eight knives with common shapes were used. 
Each gun and each knife was displayed in an easy view and a 
rotated view to measure the effect of viewpoint. In order to 
equalize image difficulty resulting from viewpoint changes, 
guns were more rotated than knives based on results of a pilot 
study. Each view was combined with two hags of low 
complexity, once with low superposition and once with high 
superposition. These combinations were also generated using 
two closed-packed bags with a higher degree of bag 
complexity. In addition, each bag was presented once with and 
once without the threat item. Thus, there were a total of 256 
trials: 2 weapons (guns, knives) * 8 (exemplars) * 2 (views) * 
2 (bag complexities) * 2 (superpositions) * 2 (harmless vs. 
threat images). There were four blocks of 64 trials each. The 
order of blocks was counterbalanced across four groups of 
participants using a Latin Square. Within each block the order 
of trials was random. 
The ORT is fully computer-based. After task insh-uctions an 
introductory session followed using 2 guns and 2 knives not 
displayed in the test phase. Feedback was provided after each 
trial but only in the introductory phase. Prior to the test phase, 
the eight guns and eight knives used at test were presented for 
10 seconds, respectively. Half of the guns and knives were 
shown in an easy view and half of them were depicted in a 
rotated view. At test, each object was presented in the easy and 
the rotated view with low and high superposition and with low 
and high bag complexity. Each image was displayed for 4 
seconds. This duration was chosen to match the demands of 
high passenger flow where average X-ray image inspection 
time at checkpoints is in the range of 3-5 seconds. For each X- 
ray image, participants had to decide whether the X-ray images 
contained one of the guns or knives shown in the introductory 
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phase or not (NOT OK or OK response). Confidence ratings 
had to he provided by changing the position of a slider (90 
point scale). The next trial was started by pressing the space 
bar. Short breaks were possible after completing one of the 
four blocks. 
It is important to take the hit rate as well as the false alarm 
rate into account if threat and non-threat images are used in a 
computer-based test requiring OK and NOT OK responses. 
The reason is simple: A candidate could achieve a hit rate of 
100% simply by judging all bags as being NOT OK. Whether 
a high hit rate reflects good visual detection performance, or 
just a lenient response bias, can only he determined if the false 
alarm rate is considered too. Psychophysics provides several 
methods in order to derive more valid estimates based on hit 
and false alarm rates. A well-known measure from signal 
detection theory is d’ 191. It equals z(H) - z(FA) whereas H 
denotes the hit rate, FA the false alarm rate and z represents 
the transformation into z-scores (standard deviation units). An 
often used “non-parametric” measure is A [IO]. This measure 
represents an estimate of the area under an ROC curve that is 
specified by only one data point. More specifically, A’ 
corresponds to the average area for the two linear ROC curves 
that maximize and minimize the hit rate. The term ‘‘non- 
parametric” is a hit misleading because it only refers to the fact 
that the computation of A’ doesn’t require an priori 
assumption ahout the underlying distributions ([I I] and [ U ] ) .  
This has sometimes been regarded as an advantage over SDT 
measures such as d’ and Am (for a more detailed discussion of 
this issue see also [13]). Although only A data are reported in 
this study, it should he stressed that similar results were 
obtained ford’ data. Moreover, correlations between A and d’ 
were very high for both tests and screeners groups (ORT: r = 
.94 for screeners and r = .97 for novices, PIT r = .95 for 
screeners and r = .98 for novices, all p < ,001). 
The results section is organized as follows. First, ANOVA 
results of the ORT are presented. These analyses were 
conducted to investigate whether detection performance of 
aviation security screeners and novices is affected by image- 
based factors. In addition, the effect of expertise on the three 
image-based factors measured by the ORT was examined. 
Second, overall detection performance in the ORT is 
compared to overall detection performance in the PIT’. More 
specifically, the effect of expertise on image-based factors and 
knowledge-based factors is analyzed, comparing detection 
performance of aviations security screeners with that of 
novices in the two tests. Finally, the results of reliability 
analyses are presented which were conducted to evaluate 
whether the ORT and PIT can be used for measuring detection 
performance on an individual basis. 
’ A’ scores for the PIT were calculated using the responss to images of the 
following categoies: guns, sharp object$ hunt and blunt insmmenu. 
III. RESULTS 
~ 
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A. ORT and abilities to cope wifh image-based factors 
A scores calculated from hit and false alarm rates of the 
ORT were subjected to three-way analyses of v&ance 
(ANOVA) with the three within-participants factors view, hag 
complexity and superposition. Results of aviation security 
screeners show that there were significant main effects of view 
(easy vs. rotated) with an effect size of q2 = .71, F(1, 133) = 
318.59, MSE = 0 . 0 0 3 , ~  < ,001, bag complexity (low vs. high) 
q2 = 3 3 ,  F(1, 133) = 652.96, MSE = 0.003, p < ,001, and 
superposition (low vs. high) q 2 =  .61, F(I, 133) = 203.73, MSE 
= 0.003, p < ,001. The following two-way interactions were 
significant: View * superposition qz = .12, F(1, 133) = 17.91, 
MSE = 0.002, p < ,001, hag complexity * superposition q2 = 
.12, F(1, 133) = 18.22, MSE= 0.002.p < ,001. Note however, 
that the effect sizes of these interactions are rather low when 
compared to the effect sizes of the main effects. All other 
interactions were not significant. In short, there were clear 
rm 
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View Bag complexily Superposition 
Fig. 3. Detection performance (A’) in the ORT with $rand& deviations: (a) 
for aviations security screenen, (%) for novices. 
main effects of view, hag complexity and superposition with 
very large effect sizes (see also conventions by [14]). Some 
interactions reached statistical significance, hut the effect sizes 
were relatively small when compared to the effect sizes of the 
main effects. 
Similar results could he observed for novices. Again, there 
were significant main effects of view (easy vs. rotated) q2 = 
.76, F(1, 133) = 428.33, MSE = 0.005, p < ,001, hag 
complexity (low vs. high) q2=  .72, F(1, 133) = 333.14, MSE = 
0.005, p < ,001, and superposition (low vs. high) tf = .63, F(1, 
133) = 228.09, MSE = 0.004, p < ,001. All two-way 
interactions were significant: View * hag complexity q’ = .06, 
F(1, 133) = 9.07, MSE = 0.004. p < .01, view * superposition 
q’ = .07, F(I, 133) = 10.43, MSE = 0.004, p < .01, hag 
complexity * superposition q2 = .15, F(I, 133) = 23.15, MSE= 
0.004, p < ,001. The three-way interaction between view, hag 
complexity and superposition also reached statistical 
significance, q* = .03, F(1, 133) = 4.14, MSE = 0 . 0 0 4 , ~  < .05. 
As for screeners, very large effect sizes were found for main 
effects whereas the interactions showed much smaller effect 
sizes. 
Figure 3 shows the main effects of each of the three image- 
based factors, averaged across the other two factors. A 
comparison of Figure 3a (aviation security screeners) and 
Figure 3b (novices) reveals that screeners were slightly better 
than novices while both screener groups are substantially 
affected by the image-based factors view, bag complexity, and 
superposition. In order to examine whether expertise has a 
differential effect on these image-based factors, a four-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-participants 
factors view, hag complexity and superposition and the 
hetween-participant factor expertise was computed. There 
were again significant main effects of view (easy vs. rotated) 
q2 = .74, F(I, 266) = 744.57, MSE = 0.004, p < ,001, bag 
complexity (low vs. high) qz = .77, F(1,266) = 884.75, MSE = 
0 . 0 0 4 , ~  < ,001, and superposition (low vs. high) q’ = .62, F(1, 
266) = 428.20, MSE = 0 . 0 0 4 , ~  < ,001. Two-way interactions 
between view and hag complexity ‘1’ = .04, F(1,266) = 10.23, 
MSE = 0.003, p < .01, view and superposition q’ = .09, F(1, 
266) = 26.17, MSE = 0.003.p < ,001, view and expertise q* = 
.lo, F(1. 266) = 30.52, p < ,001, and superposition and 
expertise q’ = .03, F(1, 266) = 9 . 3 9 , ~  c .01 were significant, 
as well as the tree-way interactions between view, hag 
complexity and superposition q2 = .02, F(1, 266) = 5.47, MSE 
= 0.003, p < .05, and bag complexity, superposition and 
expertise q’ = .13, F(1, 266) = 4 1 . 1 3 , ~  < ,001. Although these 
interactions were significant, all of them have relatively low 
effect sizes when compared to the main effects All other 
interactions were not significant. 
In short, these results indicate that the effects of image- 
based factors are apparent for novices as well as for aviation 
security screeners and expertise does only slightly reduce these 
effects of view, hag complexity and superposition. 
E. PIT, visual knowledge and expertise 
In contrast to the ORT, the PIT has been developed to 
measure whether screeners know which items are prohibited 
and how they look like in X-ray images of passenger bags [2]. 
Whereas in the ORT only guns and knives are used - object 
shapes that are also familiar to novices - the PIT contains all 
kinds of forbidden objects based on international prohibited 
items lists. In this test, all target objects are shown in an easy 
viewpoint with a moderate degree of superposition in bags of 
moderate hag complexity. As mentioned above, each image is 
shown for 10 seconds and therefore missing a threat item in 
the PIT can rather be attributed to a lack of visual knowledge 
than to an attentional failure or visual processing capacity 
limitations. If detection performance in the PIT is indeed 
mainly determined by visual experience and training with X- 
ray images, large differences between novices and aviation 
security screeners should be observed in this test. As reported 
in the previous section, only moderate differences between 
novices and screeners were found for the ORT. 
In order to compare relative difference between experts and 
novices for the PIT and ORT, overall hit and false alarm rates 
were used to compute relative detection performance 
difference separately for the ORT and PIT using the following 
formula: (A’,,,,,, - A’,,,,,,) I A’nov;es. Relative detection 
performance difference between experts and novices was 
indeed much higher for the PIT than for the ORT (15.89% vs. 
6.05%). This is consistent with the view that the PIT measures 
visual knowledge dependent on training and expertise, whereas 
the ORT measures more stable visual abilities used to cope 
with image-based factors such as effects of view, bag 
complexity and superposition. 
This main finding was further analyzed using a two-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-participant 
factor test type (ORT, PIT) and the between-participant factor 
expertise using overall A’ scores from each test. There was a 
significant effect of test type (ORT vs. PIT) ‘1’ = .SO, F(1,266) 
= 1075.10, MSE = 0.002, p < ,001, a significant effect of 
expertise (experts vs. novices) q2 = .44, F(1, 266) = 206.11, 
MSE = 0.004, p < ,001, and a significant interaction of test 
type and expertise q’ = .20, F(I, 266) = 65.30, p < ,001. The 
interaction between test type and expertise is consistent with 
the hypothesis that the ORT measures rather image-based 
factors whereas the PIT measures rather knowledge-based 
factors. 
It must also he noted however, that correlation analyses 
showed that the two tests are far from being orthogonal. 
Overall detection performance A’ of the two tests correlates 
with r = S I ,  p < ,001 for experts, and r = .42, p < ,001 for 
novices. This could at least indicate that detection performance 
in PIT is not only determined by visual knowledge hut also by 
visual abilities used to cope with image-based factors as 
measured by the ORT. 
One potential argument against the analyses of this section 
could he that the expert group consisted of males and females, 
whereas the novices group consisted only of males. However, 
it is unlikely that gender effects can explain the differences 
found between experts and novices since no significant 
differences were found between male and female screeners, 
neither for the ORT (p = .70) nor for the PIT (p = .78). 
C. Reliability analyses 
Internal reliability was analyzed using Cronbach’s Alpha 
and Guttman split-half coefficients separately for both 
participant groups (aviation security screeners and novices). 
Analyses were computed for signal plus noise trials (hags 
including a threat item) and noise trials (harmless hags), 
respectively. Reliability coefficients were computed on the 
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basis of the percentage correct measures (i.e. hit and correct 
rejections), as well as on the basis of the screeners' confidence 
ratings (CR) for hits and correct rejections. As can be seen in 
Table I high reliability coefficients were found for both tests 
and participant groups. 
The results of section 3.1 have clearly shown that item 
difticulty in the ORT depends on the main effects and 
interactions between view, hag complexity and superposition. 
Therefore, the high internal consistency also found for the 
ORT is a nice example for the fact that a test can be 
homogenous and multifactorial (see also for example [15]). 
TABLE I 
RELIABILITY ANALYSES 
PC PC CR CR 
SN N SN N Reliability Coefficients 
Cronbach Alpha ,840 ,878 ,887 ,924 
SCr=e"eE 
both for novices as well as experts. Internal reliability was 
very high for both groups. Therefore, this test could be a 
useful tool both for competency assessment of screeners as 
well as for pre-employment assessment purposes. 
The PIT has been developed to measure whether a screener 
knows which items are prohibited and what they look like in 
X-ray images of passenger bags [2]. In this test, all objects are 
depicted in an easy view. Bag complexity and superposition 
are moderate so that the threat item shapes are visible. Images 
are shown for 10 seconds, i.e. missing a threat item can be 
attributed to a lack of visual knowledge rather than to an 
attentional failure or a visual processing capacity limitation. If 
the PIT is indeed related to visual knowledge based on 
expertise and training, large differences between novices and 
experts should be observed. Indeed, relative detection 
performance difference between novices and experts was more 
than three times higher for the PIT than for the ORT. This 
result is consistent with the view that the PIT measures rather ~ ~~ ~ ~~ 
Split-half ,811 ,915 ,859 ,948 knowledge-based factors whereas the ORT measures rather 
visual abilities used for coping with image-based factors. As Cronbach Alpha ,871 ,877 385 ,914 
for the ORT, excellent reliability Coefficients were found for 
PIT 
Novices 
Split-half ,882 ,862 ,883 ,890 the PIT. This test could therefore provide a useful tool for 
~ ~ 
Cronbach Alpha 862 934 902 962 
SCXe"US 
%lit-half ,733 ,813 .792 ,887 
ORT 
Cronbach Alpha ,899 ,910 ,916 ,959 
Split~half .778 ,810 ,759 ,907 
Novices 
Nore. Cronbach Alpha YBIUCS and split-half reliabilities (Guttman) far both 
tests in each mow (emens and novices smaratelv) calculated for ~ercentaee 
certification, competency and risk assessment as well as for 
quality control in general. 
In summary, the results of this study confirm that X-ray 
detection performance relies on visual abilities necessary for 
coping with image-based effects such as view, bag complexity 
and superposition. Visual experience and training are 
necessary to know which items are prohibited and what they 
look like in X-ray images of passenger hags. Both aspects are 
prerequisites for a good screener and can be evaluated using _ .  . . .. _ . .  - - 
correct (K) and confidence ratings (CR) Separately for signal plus noire 
trials (SN) and noise r h l r  (N). 
the ORT and PIT, 
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